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   In recent years  international comparisons emphasized the  importance of 
institutional and legal factors in capital market development and  the 
performance of private firms.  Here that approach is applied to the pricing of 
bank loans .Loan rates depend on contract parameters such as risk, the existence 
of covenants and loan size. Syndicate structure and the number of lenders also 
determine the cost of borrowing. Loan prices are also negatively impacted if the 
lending banks operate as part of larger conglomerates.  Loan prices are also 
shown to depend on a number of institutional factors, such as the quality of 
protection of creditor rights and the quality of law enforcement.  Curiously, we 
find that contracts with customers in "French tradition" countries were priced 
lower, as if having lower risk, than others, other things held equal.  This is not 
in line with other segments  of the literature on international capital market 
differences and institutional factors.  It suggests that differences across legal 
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1.  Introduction: 
 
Considerable knowledge on the economic prospect of firms relies on 
country-level indicators of the business environment. The literature u ses 
proxy indicators such as regulations, disclosure, degree of political 
corruption, law and order tradition etc. Most of these proxies are relatively 
stable and hence represent country or region effects. Industry level research   
such as Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Klapper and Love (2004) estimate 
the effects of environmental factors on the performance of industry. The 
attempts to identify the impact of environmental features led to many studies 
that rely on cross -country comparisons.  
 
In this paper we carry out a cross-country analysis of the loan market. We   
explore the impact of legal requirements and enforcement policy on the cost 
of loans to non- financial entities. Specifically, we ask how differences in 
ownership structure and regulatory practices, such as those that are described 
by Cremers and Nair (2005) and Demirguc-Kunt, Love and Maksimovic 
(2006), impact the pricing of loans to business borrowers. In particular we 
are interested  in how legal restrictions change   the relationship between 
banks and industrial and commercial corporations. These relationships are 
likely to affect loan prices and contract terms as noted by Prowes (1990) and 
Park (2000). The integration of banking and commerce, in past studies 
focused on a few leading countries such as the US, UK and Japan. In this 
paper we extend the investigation to a much wider cross-country study. 
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We also examine the impact of the industrial structure of the banking 
industry on loan pricing. The classical “Structure -Conduct -Performance” 
(SCP),  as noted by Carlton and Peloff (2000), follows the theory of 
industrial organization.  Highly concentrated markets are less competitive 
than markets in  which small firms operate. Banks in less competitive 
markets are expected to pay less for their inputs and sell their outputs at a 
higher price. According to Berger (1995), Rhoads (2000) and Corvoisier and 
Gropp (2002) when the industry is concentrated, banks may collude and 
behave like a cartel that uses market power to extract monopoly rents.  
 
The main   findings of our research can be summarized as follows. The 
degree of banking and commerce integration is an important determinant   of 
loan prices. Market concentration has a much lower  impact than the legal 
and institutional variables which are important determinants of lending rates. 
Loan rates are lower in countries that have strong creditor rights. Similarly 
traditions of law and order are negatively related to loan prices. This is in 
line with findings of earlier studies.  
 
This paper contributes to the literature   in two modest ways. First,   we 
explicitly examine the impact of the legal restrictions on the ownership of 
non-financial firms by banks on loan rates in a cross-country setting. 
Second, by using firm level data we utilize an international sample to show 
that different legal requirements and different regulations have different 
impacts on loan pricing.  
 
 
The remainder of the paper is organizing as follows. In section 2 we review 
the related literature. In section  3 we present a summary of the research 
hypotheses. Section  4 describes the data and presents some summary 
statistics. Results are reported on section 5 and section 6 concludes.   5 
 
2.  Review of the Literature : 
 
A large and growing literature in finance has addressed questions about the 
role of institutional a nd legal factors in explaining differences in capital 
markets across countries.   One of the pioneering works in this "around the 
world" analytic approach was an early paper by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (hereafter LLSV), published in 1998.  That paper 
attempted to explain differences in the degree of development of capital 
markets across many (49) countries based on legal institutions, and in 
particular on institutional protections of property rights and investor rights.  
That paper was quickly followed by many works investigating the role of 
institutions in growth and development of capital markets, using similar 
international "around the world" comparisons.  
 
La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and  Vishny, (1997, 2000) found that 
"French tradition" countries have  a comparatively weak protection of 
investor rights and the weakest capital markets.  LLSV (1998) found that 
"French tradition" legal systems protected investors the least well. Capital 
markets in those "French tradition" countries tended to be the least 
developed, based on a number of indicators, including diffusion of share 
ownership. French tradition countries also seem to be deficient compared 
with others when it comes to constitutional checks and balances, which are 
crucial for economic freedom and - by implication - for economic growth.   
 
 
La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) showed that poor 
quality of legal protection and enforcement is associated with small and 
poorly developed capital markets. 
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Quite a few other institutional and legal factors have been assessed in terms 
of their impact on capital market differences across countries.  La Porta, et al 
(1998) attribute international differences in capital market performance to 
differences in the nature of the legal resolution of agency problems between 
investors and entrepreneurs.  La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and  
Vishny (2000) attribute these differences to a dispersion in equity ownership 
concentration. Similar conclusions are reached by Beck, Levine, and Loayza 
(2000) who point to the role of financial intermediaries in economic growth. 
These authors emphasize the importance of protecting the law enforcement 
institutions from coercion and bribery.  Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) 
attribute international differences in the incidence of going public to 
differences in law enforcement.  Demirguc-Kunt,  Love and Maksimovic 
(2006) used a similar international comparison to analyze incorporation 
decisions.  
 
      While most of this literature on institutional explanations for development 
of capital markets has focused on equity and debt markets, there have been 
only few attempts to apply this approach to banking markets as well. 
Papaioannou (2005) showed that institutional factors play an important role 
in international flows of bank funds.  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and 
Shleifer (2002)  asked which factors, including legal traditions, tend to 
generate higher rates of government ownership of banks. They found that 
such ownership is associated with low levels of GDP/capital, interventionist 
government policies, and poor protection of property rights.  Government 
ownership is also a factor in causing slower economic growth. 
 
 
In addition to the  legal factors,  group relationship between banks and non-
banking firms are likely to influence  loan pricing. Earlier studies, such as 
Haubrich and Santos (2005),  Johnson,  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and   7 
Shleifer (2000) and Dyck and Zingales (2004),   ” examined the costs and 
benefits of the integration between banking and commerce. The literature 
noted a few reasons for restricting the integration of banking and commerce. 
First, as notes by Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) and others, when banks 
hold large equity portfolio in non-financial  firms they have an incentive to 
finance risky project of their related firms. This, in turn, leads to larger debts 
holding and thereby increases the risk of the banks loan portfolio. Second, 
universal banks that hold a large portfolio of industrial subsidiaries  may 
became “too big to discipline” in the political sense. Third, as noted in the 
literature, universal banks or similar financial conglomerates may restrict 
competition. 
 
The finance literature dealt with the possible merits and deficiencies of bank 
led business groups. Some studies emphasis the impact of internal capital 
markets that exist  in business   groups (see  Rajan  Servaes and  Zingales 
(2000)). Shin and Stulz  (1998) claim that the internal capital markets may 
miss-allocate capital among members of the groups. The empirical literature 
did not  produce consistent results. Many studies examine the effects of 
group diversification on firm performance. In some cases the costs of 
diversification     were found too outweigh its benefits (Lins and Servaes 
(2002). On the other hand, operating within a group might provide some 
benefits to the  member firms (Khanna and Palepu (2000) ) and Kahanna and 
Rivkin (2001)). They argue that, in developing economies,  an internal 
capital market have an advantage. Banks have much better information on 
the quality of projects that members of their own group wish to finance.    
 
This would mean, in turn, that they may lend to group members at a discount 
compared  with the interest rates that they would charge  to external 
borrowers. 
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The above argument is also related to general transaction cost theory. In fact, 
the  importance of legal institutions is generated mainly by  causing a 
reduction of transaction cost. This was stated by Williamson (1975) and 
stressed by others. If the economic or institutional setup reduces information 
asymmetries and conflicts of interest between buyers and sellers, transaction 
costs will be lower. This means, by extension, that lending rates within the 
groups will also be lower. 
 
In many countries firms can create value to share holders by focusing on a 
specific (narrow) activities and  conduct  financial transactions  with other 
group members. So, highly diversified business groups can confer benefits 
on their members. One of the main benefits is low cost loans. In such 
environments business groups create value for owners by using available 
funds i n one sector to finance new ventures in another. Thus, when banks 
own non-financial firms they eliminate some of the results of markets 
imperfections that prevail outside of the group structure. 
 
3.  The sample: 
 
The loan contract data are taken from the DealScan data base. This data base 
is compiled by the Loan Pricing Corporation. The data base was used in the 
past by Dennis and Mullineaux ( 2000) and Hubbard, Kuttner a nd Palia 
(2002) among others. The data base includes borrowers and lenders location 
code in addition to various loan transaction parameters. We use data for the  
 
 
13 years period from 1992 to the end of 2004. We use the  borrower’s 
location code to link the contracts to the 42 countries that are listed in Table 
1. For each country we use legal and institutional characteristics offered by 
LLSV(1997), LLSV(1998) and  Beck  Levine and Loayza (2000).  Only   9 
18,367 contracts that include information on all the required variables and 
all the listed countries are used for our analysis. All contracts are local in the 
sense that both borrowers and lenders are registered as transaction  parties 
from the same country.  
 
The loan sample and loan pricing variable are described in summary form in 
Table 1.  The entire sample consists of 18,367 loan contracts, or loan 
facilities made between the years 1992 and 2004.  The United States 
represents more than half of these.  All loan contracts in the sample are 
expressed in US dollar terms. For the ease of comparison, the main pricing 
variable is the markup over the LIBOR or over a prime base. The markup 
has been adjusted for any fixed facility fees, assumed to be spread evenly 
over the  duration of the loan.  The markup, which abstracts from the 
countrys macro-determined interest rate, is expressed in basis points.   
 
 The mean markup for the sample is about 122 basis points, with the median 
slightly less, suggesting a slightly asymmetric distribution with a broader 
right-hand tail.  Contracts with American clients, were on average, more 
expensive than non-American clients,  (about 177 basis points), with the 
median above the mean, suggesting that for US clients the right-hand tail of 
the distribution is thinner than the left-hand tail.  For most other countries, 
the curve is skewed in the other direction.  The UK represents the second 
largest set of borrowers, followed by France and  Canada. The average 
markup over the benchmark varies across national borrowing groups. South  
 
 
American  countries tend to have the highest mean markups.  Several 
European countries, together with South Africa and Israel have the lowest.   
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In  Table 2  a number of institutional features are described. A detailed 
description of the data is provided in the appendix.  Using the  La Porta, 
Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) basis for categorization, each 
country of borrowers is assigned to either the "English", "French", or 
"Continental" legal tradition.  The countries belonging to the three sets are 
not homogeneous across the categories. Countries in the French legal 
tradition exhibit high inflation rates, while continental have lower inflation 
rates. The fact that higher Inflation countries tend to be in the French legal 
tradition is outside the scope of the present analysis. 
 
A private credit variable, which follows Beck, Levine and loayza (2000), 
represents the share of credit granted to the private sector out of GDP. The 
index ranges from about 0.2 to 1.2. Rule of law is as describe in La Porta, 
Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) and, for the countries in our 
sample,  ranges from 2 to 10. Creditor rights range from 0 to 4. In addition 
Table 2 contains a column that defines the banking industry concentration. 
This is the concentration of asset in the largest 5 top banks (i.e. their share of 
total bank assets).  
  
4.  Results: 
 
In  Table 3 , regression results are presented for the entire sample.  The 
definitions of all the variables that we use appear in the appendix. The 
dependent variable is the interest rate spread above an appropriate 
benchmark. It includes prorated facility fees measured in basis points.  Six  
 
 
different versions of the regression are shown.  Explanatory variables consist 
of  three sets, including loan contract variables, national institutional and 
legal variables, and banking sector variables.  Because clients from the   11 
United States represent such a large portion of the entire sample and because 
the US is unique in many ways, a dummy variable for US borrowers is also 
included.  It is positive and significant, indicating that  US  business 
borrowers paid a higher interest rate than others, all other factors being held 
constant.  The regressions explain  almost  30%  of the variation in loan 
markup values across contracts. 
 
 In Table 3, the group of loan contract variables behaves as expected. The 
credit rating of the borrower is negatively and significantly associated with 
the interest rate charged. A better rating is rewarded with a lower interest 
rate, other things equal.  Each full-grade  improvement generates a drop in 
the interest markup by about 130 basis points.  The size of the loan facility is 
also negatively and significantly associated with the interest rate.   Larger 
facilities  carry  significantly  lower interest rates, o ther things equal.  A 
probable reason for that is that loan size serves as a surrogate for the size of 
the borrower.  It too is negative and significant. 
 
 Syndication measures are  basically  supply side measurements, although 
they may be affected also by demand side f actors.  The structure of the 
lending side, for business loan contracts, appears to affect loan pricing in a 
non-linear and non-monotonic manner.  Accordingly, we included two 
different indicators in the regressions.  First, simply providing funds via a 
syndicate rather than by a single lender has a significant negative impact on 
loan costs, other things equal.  However, given that a syndicate is already in 
operation, additions to the number of lenders in the syndicate appear to raise  
 
 
loan interest charged.   This could be because contracts with a larger number 
of lenders in the syndicate tend to be somewhat riskier for the lenders. As in 
Melnik and Plaut (1996), larger syndicates are being recruited to serve   12 
riskier borrowers. Finally, the presence of loan restrictions, or covenants, in 
the contract appears to be a negative quality indicator and is associated with 
an increase in interest costs of 90 basis points. Loan maturity does not have a 
significant impact on loan pricing in the present sample.  
 
The next set of variables is the focuses of these paper .The first two entries 
are  French origin dummy and continental origin dummy. The default 
category in the regression is English tradition. In Table 3, loan contracts for 
borrowers from countries having a French legal tradition were priced below 
those of others. The coefficient for the dummy for "Continental" tradition 
(which Includes Scandinavian countries) is also negative.  
 
 The other national institutional indicators include two legal measures that 
presumably affect bank lending  friskiness and readiness.  The first is a 
measurement of creditor rights, indicating how easily a creditor may 
exercise his or her rights or how easy it is to foreclose on collateral.  The 
coefficient for this variable is negative and significant. An improvement in 
this measure by one grade lowers interest costs significantly.  The measure 
of "rule of law" is an indicator of the efficiency and transparency of the law 
enforcement system in place in the country of question. It is also statistically 
significant and carries a minus sign.   
 
The variable of “Bank Ownership” of industrial and commercial firms 
essentially reflects restrictions on the ability of banks to be part of a business 
group. The coefficient of this dummy variable is significantly negative (see  
 
 
equations 3 and 6 in the table). Evidently borrowers pay    lower loan rates to 
their lenders in countries that allow group ownership. The results are 
consistent with the view that cross ownership, or membership in the same   13 
group, facilitates the transfer of information between borrowers and lenders, 
and thereby reduce loan contract costs.  
 
The other variables of importance in our study are loan  propose, private 
sector credit and bank concentration. The loan proposes variable is a dummy 
variable. It takes the value of one if the main loan proposes is debt 
repayment (which does not increase financial leverage) and zero for all other 
loan use declarations.  As shown in equation  2 it is not   statistically 
significant.  
 
Surprisingly the private sector credit variable does not seem to have much 
importance. The size of the private  sector  credit,  relative to the entire 
economy, does not seem to have any significant impact. In fact, it shows up 
with negative sign in some regressions and positive sign in the others.  The 
concentration ratio for bank  assets (equation 4) appeared without much 
significance. Following the SCP theory we expected that domestic lenders 
would extract monopoly rents. In our case the results do not support the 
market power theory.  
 
Table 4 shows similar regression results. The equations, in Table 4, replicate 
equations 2, 3, and 4 in Table 3. For the sample with US contracts excluded. 
Given the large portion of the sample consisting of US borrowers, this could 
clearly affect the relative pricing position of "English legal tradition" 




Change much. The coefficients for most explanatory variables are generally  
Similar to these of the comparable regressions that appear in Table 3. 
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5.  Summary and Conclusions: 
 
Cross-national differences in bank loan markets are explained, in part, by 
legal and institutional factors.   The quality of law enforcement and of 
creditor rights protection are associated with lower lending costs, as would 
be expected to be the case.  Restrictions on the ability of banks to own 
commercial enterprises and join larger "business groups" that include non-
bank firms seems to be associated with higher costs of borrowing.  
 
 The contract-specific explanatory variables examined here seem to operate, 
in bank loan contracts, in ways that are consistent with previous research. 
However, the facility size appears to be also a borrower quality surrogate, 
where larger facilities are priced at lower risk markups.  Syndicate structure, 
whose   impact on loan pricing has been the focus of relatively little previous 
empirical analysis, appears to operate in a complex non-monotonic manner.  
The very existence of a lending syndicate is associated with lower costs of 
lending, other things equal.  But given that a syndicate exists, larger 
syndicates are associated with higher costs, suggesting that syndicate size 
grows when borrowers are riskier, other things equal. 
 
  In contrast with what  has been found in much previous cross-national 
analyses of capital market development and performance, "French tradition" 
in this paper is found to be associated with cheaper borrowing from banks.  
It may be that certain institutional factors affect securities markets in ways 
that are very different from how they affect banking markets, and indeed  
 
 
these affects can even be in opposite directions.  This is an intriguing 
possibility that should be explored further in future research.  It seems to be 
consistent with the fact that countries in which commercial borrowers rely   15 
mainly on bank financing tend also to be those with less developed securities 
markets.  In different countries, different sorts of selection may be operating 
in channeling borrowers to bank borrowing as opposed to issuing of 
securities.  Such selection then would produce differences in pricing. 
 
 The "institutional approach" to analyzing international differences in 
financial markets has emerged as an important tool of economic 
development research.   Inclusion of banking markets in such analysis may 
contribute to our understanding of the economic role of institutions and 
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Appendix - description of the data: 
 
1.  Dependent Variable 
 
The dependent variable is the loan price, above a base rate such as prime or LIBOR 
measured in basis points. In DealScan, the all-in-spread  includes the  contract or 
coupon spread plus an annual fee. An up-front fee (if any) divided by the time to 
maturity of the loan is also added to the price.  
 
2.  Contract Variables 
 
a.  Credit Rating i s a measure of the risk of the loan. It is based on Moodys credit 
ratings of the borrower’s senior debt. The top rank, AAA, is assigned number 5. 
The second group of AA+ and AA is noted as 4. The third group ( rank number 3) 
includes the rating AA- and A+. The fourth rank includes the group of A- to be 
BBB and has the mark of 2. The final group covers the range below BBB and is 
marked as 1. 
 
b.  Loan  amounts are expressed in millions. We use    a natural logarithm of the 
amount. The amount  represents the size of the loan. It also may serve as a proxy 
to the size of the borrower. 
 
c.  A syndicated loan dummy variable is included. The data set contains both 
syndicated and non-syndicated loans. Syndicated loans are granted by several 
banks and may carry a lower rate due to risk diversification. 
 
d.  The number of lenders, in a l og form, reflects the idea that more lenders are 
invited to join a syndicate if the loan is perceived to be more risky. 
 
e.   A restriction dummy variable equals 1 if the loan contract specifies a restrictive 
covenant.  Restrictions could be viewed as a sign that the loan is viewed as more 
risky and requires the future transmission of information from the borrower to the 
lender. 
 
f.  Maturity is the number of years to the formal maturity date. It is entered with a 
logarithmic transformation. 
 
3.  Legal Variables 
 
a.  Legal origin dummy variables. We include a distinction between French l aw, 
Continental law (German and Scandinavian) and English  Law ( the default 
option). The list is compiled by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1998). 
 
b.  Rule of law variable evaluates the tradition of law enforcement. It is an index that 
ranges from zero to ten and higher scores are allocated for a stronger tradition of 
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c.  Creditors rights is an index constructed by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (1998) and measures such things as creditor consent to file for 
reorganization, rights to take over securities posted as guarantees etc. The index 
ranges from 0 to 4. Higher values indicate stronger creditors rights 
 
d.  Bank ownership is a measure of the abilities of Banks to own and control non-
financial firms. If bank ownership of commercial and industrial firms is 
permitted the variable takes on a value of 1.    
 
 
4.  Other Variables 
 
a.  Loans propose is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the main loans 
propose is debt repayment and 0 otherwise. The loan repayment propose 
indicates a constant loan burden and is expected to be less risky compared with 
other loans that increase the overall amount of debts. 
   
b.  Private sector credit is a proxy for financial development variable. This is the 
value of credit granted by  financial firms to non- financial ( private) sector 
divided by GNP. It was compiled by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt , and Levine (2000)  
(BDL) and used by Beck  et.al  (2004) and others. 
 
c.  Concentration  measure is taken from the World Bank Survey  We use two 
measure of concentration. The first is the share of assets held by the five largest 
banks in the borrower’s   country. In our sample it r anges from 0.214 in 
Germany to 0.994 in Finland. The second is the ratio of deposits held by the five 
largest Banks in the borrower’s country. In our sample it ranges from 0.297 to 
0.997.In the literature such as Berger (1995) it is argued that banks with larger 
market power (high concentration) tend to charge higher rates.   
 
d.  A dummy of 1 if concentration of assets of the five largest banks is greater then 
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Table 1-Summary statistics of loan prices by country 1992-2004. 
Loan price is expressed  in basis  points above LIBOR 
 
         
         
Median  Std.dev  Mean  N  Country 
191  141  223.4  225  Argentina 
98.5  82.4  101.6  119  Australia 
105  90.5  132.5  112  Austria 
102.1  91.5  120.7  84  Belgium 
243.5  148.6  264.4  178  Brazil 
163.5  143.6  181.8  634  Canada 
202  131.3  230.3  58  Colombia 
70.5  103.7  112.2  160  Chile 
53  148  105.9  46  Denmark 
79  78.5  129.1  29  Egypt 
41.5  87  94.8  122  Finland 
94  123.8  130.3  664  France 
173  168.5  158.6  335  Germany 
65.5  81.9  99.9  114  Greece 
96  74.6  113.1  257  Hong Kong 
77  101.2  99.8  121  India 
150.5  77.9  157.6  102  Indonesia 
87.7  145.7  130.6  101  Ireland 
45  58.6  79.5  29  Israel 
60.5  93.6  114.7  331  Italy 
64.5  88.4  87.2  52  Japan 
120.5  91.8  137.5  37  Malaysia 
200  140.6  220.9  304  Mexico 
112.5  128.9  140.6  309  Netherland 
57  133.2  102.2  27  New Zealand 
45  80.7  76.2  208  Norway 
100  58.2  104.8  36  Pakistan 
229.4  136.2  244.1  36  Peru 
131.5  90.2  152.8  34  Philippines 
39  75.2  78.5  70  Portugal 
114.5  57.3  124.8  36  Singapore 
65.5  65  79.5  93  South Africa 
63  62.7  88  94  South Korea 
75.5  92.6  104.3  424  Spain 
55  77  72.7  230  Sweden 
66  94.1  103  176  Switzerland 
65  66.4  85.5  46  Taiwan  
89.5  69.3  105.6  97  Thailand 
95  141.6  123.3  267  Turkey 
198  133  176.6  10,018  USA 
100  104.1  123.4  1894  U.Kingdom 
201  119.7  198.9  58  Venezuela 
              
109  93.4  121.8  18,367    
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Table 2- Legal Variables 
 
Bank own of 
c& i 
Asset ratio of 








Orgin  Country 
Restricted  0.49  1  5.36  0.246  French  Argentina 
Permitted  0.76  1  10  0.514  English  Australia 
Permitted  ###  3  10  0.985  Cont  Austria 
Permitted  0.88  2  10  0.756  French  Belgium 
Permitted  0.536  1  6.32  0.272  French  Brazil 
Permitted  0.801  1  10  0.661  English  Canada 
Restricted  0.41  0  2.08  0.253  French  Colombia 
 Prohibited  0.608  2  7.02  0.623  French  Chile 
Restricted  0.902  3  10  0.34  Cont  Denmark 
Restricted  0.618  4  4.17  0.486  French  Egypt 
Permitted  0.994  1  10  0.508  Cont  Finland 
Permitted  0.647  0  8.98  0.82  French  France 
Permitted  0.214  3  9.23  1.136  Cont  Germany 
Permitted  0.739  1  6.18  0.26  French  Greece 
Permitted  0.42  4  8.22  ###  English  Hong Kong 
Restricted  0.435  4  4.17  0.224  English  India 
###  ##  4  3.98  0.333  French  Indonesia 
Permitted  ##  1  7.8  0.507  English  Ireland 
Restricted  0.934  4  4.82  0.771  English  Israel 
Permitted  0.574  2  8.33  0.57  French  Italy 
Restricted  0.464  2  8.98  1.164  Cont  Japan 
Restricted  0.556  4  6.78  0.935  English  Malaysia 
Restricted  0.802  0  5.35  0.153  French  Mexico 
Permitted  0.881  2  10  1.055  French  Nether land 
Permitted  0.856  3  10  0.942  English  New Zealand 
Permitted  0.84  2  10  0.614  Cont  Norway 
Permitted  0.647  4  3.03  ###  English  Pakistan 
Permitted  0.825  0  2.5  0.271  French  Peru 
Permitted  0.43  0  2.73  0.425  French  Philippine 
Restricted  0.796  1  8.68  0.902  French  Portugal 
 Prohibited  0.685  3  8.57  1.061  English  Singapore 
Permitted  0.752  4  4.42  0.663  English  South Africa 
Restricted  0.701  3  5.35  0.726  Cont  South Korea 
Permitted  0.532  2  7.8  0.857  French  Spain 
Permitted  0.62  2  10  0.471  Cont  Sweden 
Permitted  0.72  1  10  1.637  Cont  Switzerland 
Restricted  0.384  2  8.52  1.405  Cont  Taiwan  
Restricted  0.648  3  6.25  1.09  English  Thailand 
Permitted  0.556  2  5.18  0.184  French  Turkey 
Restricted  0.304  1  10  0.56  English  USA 
Permitted  0.243  4  8.57  1.181  English  U.Kingdom 
Restricted  0.568  1  6.37  ###  French  Venezuela 
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Table 3- The Determinants of Loan Markup Pricing 
6  5  4  3  2  1    
             Contract Variables 
                    
-0.137  -0.137  -0.136  -0.133  -0.131  -0.121  Credit Rating 
 (0.089)   (0.088)   (0.084)   (0.085)  (0.081)  (0.076)    
-0.202  -0.206  -0.204  -0.196  -0.196  -0.201  Ln (amount) 
 (0.038)   (0.039   (0.039)   (0.036)   (0.034)   (0.038)    
-0.068  -0.065  -0.072  -0.069  -0.068  -0.066  Syndication Dummy 
 (0.017)   (0.019)   (0.018)   (0.018)   (0.019)   (0.019)    
0.041  0.019  0.019  0.019  0.041  0.041  Ln (number of lenders) 
 (0.012)   (0.012)   (0.013)   (0.011)   (0.012)   (0.011)    
0.087  0.089  0.091  0.091  0.089  0.089  Restrictions Dummy 
 (0.015)   (0.016)   (0.016)   (0.015)   (0.014)   (0.014)    
   -0.008  -0.008  -0.009  -0.011    Ln (maturity) 
    (0.007)   (0.011)   (0.009)   (0.008)       
             Legal Variables 
                    
-0.239  -0.241  -0.233  -0.231  -0.236  -0.254  French Origin Dummy  
 (0.198)   (0.195)   (0.199)   (0.189)   (0.186)   (0.184)    
-0.201  -0.201  -0.207  -0.208  -0.214  -0.217  Cont. Orgin Dummy 
 (0.131)   (0.136)   (0.135)   (0.124)   (0.129)   (0.123)    
-0.178  -0.178  -0.178  -0.177  -0.179  -0.173  Rule of Law 
 (0.081)   (0.083)   (0.082)   (0.079)   (0.078)   (0.074)    
-0.159  -0.161  -0.201  -0.171  -0.213  -0.214  Creditor Rights 
 (0.069)   (0.082)   (0.087)   (0.096)   (0.085)   (0.083)    
-0.361      -0.337      Bank Own of C&I Firms 
 (0.179)         (0.184)          
             Other Variables 
                    
         -0.086    Loan Purpose dummy 
          (0.073)      
-0.137  -0.129  -0.118  0.144  0.153  -0.077  Private Sector Credit 
 (0.187)   (0.202)   (0.195)   (0.163)   (0.199)   (0.173)    
0.098  0.116  0.147  0.121  0.138  0.101  U.S Dummy 
 (0.051)   (0.061)   (0.067)   (0.059)   (0.078)   (0.064)    
   0.151  0.119        Concent of Assets  
    (0.109)   (0.111)          
0.214            Asset Concent Dummy 
 (0.134)              
0.218  0.201  0.219  0.232  0.251  0.242  Constant 
.(0.121)   (0.145)   (0.157)   (0158)   (0.164)  .(0.178)    
0.2992  0.2911  0.2931  0.2924  0.2891  0.2852  Adjusted R square 
18,164  18,128  18,164  18,265  17,313  18,367  N   24 
 
Numbers in parentheses are White Heteroscedasticity   adjusted standard errors. 
 
 
Table 4- The Determinants of Loan Markup Pricing Without Data from the U.S 
 
3  2  1       
          Contract Variables 
-0.109  -0.096  -0.097    Credit Rating 
.( 0.056)  .( 0.054)  .(0.057)      
-0.139  -0.136  -0.136    Ln (amount) 
.(0.056)  .(0.048)  .( 0.039)      
-0.018  -0.048  -0.055    Syndication Dummy 
.( 0.025 )  .( 0.025)  .( 0.021)      
0.062  0.067  0.057    Ln (number of lenders) 
.( 0.039)  .( 0.046)  .(0.042)      
0.144  0.138  0.129    Restrictions Dummy 
.(0.075)  .( 0.074)  .( 0.085)       
-0.005  -0.006  -0.004    Ln (maturity) 
.( 0.007)  .( 0.004)  .( 0.003)       
          Legal Variables 
-0.055  -0.164  -0.181    French Origin Dummy  
.( 0.152)  .( 0.151)  .( 0.161)      
-0.217  -0.234  -0.241    Continental Origin Dummy 
.(0.133)  .(0.141)  .( 0.159)      
-0.154  -0.143  -0.182    Rule of Law 
.( 0.062)  .( 0.065)  .(0.071)      
-0.181  -0.178  -0.186    Creditor Rights 
.( 0.078)  .(0.084)  .( 0.099)      
   -0.427       Bank Ownership of C&I Firms 
   .( 0.152)          
          Other Variables 
     -0.121    Loan Purpose dummy 
     .( 0.053)      
0.282  0.254  0.291    Private Sector Credit 
.( 0.241)  .( 0.259)  .( 0.313)      
          U.S Dummy 
            
0.258         Concentration of Bank Assets 
.(0.122)           
0.254  0.247  0.234    Constant 
.( 0.139)  .( 0.138)  .( 0.118)       
0.2939  0.2885  0.2886    Adjusted R square 
8146  8247  8349     N 
 
 
Numbers in parentheses are White Heteroscedasticity   adjusted standard errors. 
 